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CN
Rail -- Prince Rupert's Most Vital Link (still)
Analysis by Larry Golden
--April 97
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I thought to call this meta-essay 'From Charles Hays to George
Hayes'.
The Grand Trunk Pacific RR founder and the contemporary
Hayes both consider Prince Rupert's destiny in the
port. But the GTP went broke; the line was nationalized into the
Canadian National (CN) in the 1920s. Since then the RR, the city,
and the port seemed separable, components of a larger systems.
Now CN has been privatized, and George Hayes (Northwest
Transportation Corridor Task Force Report--to be reviewed
later) looks towards highways and airports as integral to
Rupert's port future. Here I side with Charles: the RR = the
Port, and I am not optimistic.
CN---
Stock market-- rising
CN's Paul Tellier (yes, he
is the fellow from the Trudeau era) was the picture
boy of the winter '96
stock market and media: Railroad Age's man of the
year. Articles in Maclean's,
Traffic
World (most informative), etc.,
his acceptance speech, articulates
his vision (we are all continentalist now) etc.
The hype: Canada's "most successful
privitization"; a company remade "physically and
culturally". All this because CN's initial stock release
rose from 16$ to 60$.
The media types quipped CN was "no longer an employment
agency". And now "the chief concern is the bottom line
and not Canada".
Words of wisdom from the stock market.
Restructuring
CN for the bottom line
I see 3 CN strategies in play: Lower
Costs: Refocus; Maximize Revenues
- Lower (fixed) costs translates into fewer employees
(see table) and pruning away branch
lines.
Available figures (Table) suggest the easy cuts
are over; that increased profits came from fewer
employees, not more traffic.
The market
agrees:
| |
|
1993 |
1994 |
1995
(1st half) |
1995 |
1996
(1st half) |
| |
Route miles |
18,851 |
18,414 |
17,929 |
17,918 |
17,667 |
| Carloads (thousands) |
2,182 |
2,354 |
1,173 |
2,295 |
1,151 |
| Gross ton miles
(millions) |
193,797 |
211,805 |
103,253 |
204,143 |
104,795 |
| Revenue ton miles
(millions) |
98,650 |
109,004 |
54,488 |
105,487 |
53,585 |
| Employees
(average for the year) |
31,385 |
29,884 |
27,224 |
26,951 |
24,238 |
Diesel fuel consumed
(Canadian gallons in millions) |
250 |
266 |
133 |
256 |
132 |
| Average price per
Canadian gallon |
$1.04 |
$1.03 |
$1.10 |
$1.08 |
$1.18 |
Capital expenditures
(including capital leases) |
$442 |
$539 |
$108 |
$326 |
$106 |
| |
Source CN--modified
- When CN talks about its 'market position' they divide
their operation into "corridors"
and "Commodities" hauled. Unspoken is the
underlying concept of competitive and secure (monopoly)
transport markets. See table below.
1995
CORRIDOR freight revenues (in millions of dollars)
|
| Commodity |
Eastern |
Western* |
West-Chicago* |
Transcontinental |
Total |
| Industrial products |
$480 |
$150 |
$99 |
$119 |
$848 |
| Forest products |
319 |
107 |
286 |
62 |
774 |
| Grain and grain
products |
47 |
462 |
43 |
51 |
603 |
| Coal, sulphur and
fertilizers |
64 |
397 |
120 |
22 |
603 |
| Intermodal |
290 |
34 |
18 |
327 |
669 |
| Automotive |
320 |
1 |
13 |
78 |
412 |
| Total |
$1,520 |
$1,151 |
$579 |
$659 |
$3,909 |
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Source
CN modified
- Refocusing --recent press releases deal with New
York States lack
of competition due to US rail restructuring. Looking
at CN's system map indicates to me that CN is looking south
from Montreal as their future
- Map
source CN
- CN acts like any other private company now: it's the
bottom line not Canada that is crucial. Prairie grain
farmers have not only been hit with system
gridlock (blamed on winter storms), but have had to
absorb 2 rate
hikes.
A closer
look at western Canada's ex-ports
Dependence
on Bulk Commodities and
the Japanese Market
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- Coal and Grain drive the western export
system (both in Vancouver (graph right)
and Prince Rupert). Thus "70% of those
ports' volume is exports to Pacific Rim".
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Not only is the western ex-port market and commodity base
narrow, it is not as profitable as the eastern NAFTA market to
CN. (See Table 2 above).
More worrisome for Rupert is its
dependence on CN as these quotes reveal:
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- CN has "exclusive access to Prince
Rupert", but also "connects directly to the
Neptune Terminal in North Vancouver, which is one of the
lowest-cost bulk facilities on the Pacific Coast".
(emphasis mine)
- CN's more northerly route is "less susceptible to
grain traffic diversion through the United States".
(Marketing-speak for competition).
- Going east? " As the second-largest carrier of
forest products in North America, CN's west- to-Chicago
corridor is the shortest route to the U.S. Midwest for
northern B.C. fibre reserves." (Market-speak
for our FORESTS- emphasis mine).
The Port
of Churchill was "pruned"
It
is not mere chance Prince
Rupert was named after a Hudson Bay dignitary.
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THEMES IN CANADIAN
HISTORY
Nineteenth Century western Canadian history can be seen as
conflict between HBC and the St. Lawrence based Europeans to
control western resources. When furs became depleted, grain
became the new commodity. Thus CN and CP railroad lines
across Canada carry the two old antagonists (northern or Arctic
routes vs. southern or St. Lawrence) into the twentieth century.
If the twenty-first century is really NAFTA, then this
east-west conflict is irrelevant.
So Churchill was sold; and Rupert became a branch line.
The Mississippi drainage system supplants the St. Lawrence. Will
Canada, then, follow HBC into history?
ANY LESSONS FROM
CHURCHILL?
CN
sold to OmniTrax. I assume that short-line specialist
and locomotive renter fit into CN's vision. Churchill will just
have to adapt.
Churchill's responses look surprisingly familiar:
CPR
I
have not followed up on CP as its relevant to Vancouver
not Rupert
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Its web site is more informative than CN's: see the financial
information for example. While not so admired by the media it has
been the stock
market is less volatile:
INDEX for NorthCoast Economies
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