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Clearcutting the Pacific Rain Forest Rajala’s title is a good summary of the book’s intention: a history of clearcutting. The approach is from the left viewing modern forestry as a (Fordist) factory regime. Technological changes in felling, yarding and transport are products of corporations trying to reduce labour costs. The innovations required managerial, scientific and regulatory accommodations. The state or province was unable to effectively regulate its major revenue source. A hopeful ending is that workers and environmentalist will recognize their common enemy and combine for true sustainability. |
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CONTENTS Analyzing the ‘Mode of Production’
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Analyzing the ‘Mode of Production’
Rajala’s work reads like it had its origin in an academic
thesis (Masters?). Thus we have a well researched and peer scrutinized look
at history of clearcutting in the ‘Douglas Fir’ forests along the Pacific. As
it compares logging, scientific, and regulatory changes in Oregon, Washington,
and British Columbia, the reader is convinced of the underlying pattern. Here
I emphasize the technological changes as non foresters have little idea what
a ‘grapple yarder’ is or its implications. That science and regulators have
become ‘lapdogs’ of the industry is a second theme explored here. |
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Deskilling workers Back when oxen were the motive power for hauling huge logs out of the bush, teamsters had the power to make or break a logging camp, as they determined the rate of logging. Even with the introduction of steam ‘donkeys’ important skills were at a premium. |
Ecologically skid roads and accompanying railroad logging were limited in damage they could do because few areas were suitable topographically. Thus only the most valuable valley bottom sites attempted. The introduction of steam donkeys allowed access to steeper and more distant cutblocks. ‘High lead’ dragging logs across fragile soils and riparian areas increased dramatically the damage.
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High Riggers necessary The high lead system (above) and overhead skidder systems (right)
required highly skilled tradesmen. Of these the High rigger was often the
star and hardest to find, keep in camp. |
High lead skidders and later truck logging required more managerial planning than did older modes of production. At first only engineers were required (as at UBC well into the ‘30s). Industrial self regulation and governmental role of fire fighting were the ‘appropriate social roles. As the clearcuts became larger and regeneratin became an issue the industry turned more to the universities for expertise and justification. Thus UBC Forestry became a faculty in the 1950s with five of ten faculty positions funded by the industry.
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Assembly line jobs The introduction of gas powered chain saws, motorized
logging trucks, and caterpillars completed the ‘industrialization’ of Pacific
coast logging. The job was still dangerous, but most of the skills passed
over to the managerial class. |
The immediate effect of gas engines was to vastly increase the scale and mobility of loggers. This led many to question the sustainability of the industry. Regeneration (remember the recent “forests forever” media campaign?) soon became an issue for opposition politicians in all jurisdictions. “Science” was called upon by the industry to ‘prove’ clearcuts merely copied nature and forest would regenerate without any help (or expense) to the government or companies. Scariest or most laughable, depending on your perspective, was the Hoffman’s Seed Storage theory. No problems Douglas Fir seeds remained dormant in the soil, and would gladly regenerate a site. Thus “seed trees” left during logging nor replanting were called for. That the “experts’ were wrong was common knowledge in the industry by the 1930s thus “seed trees” became the new orthodoxy. Experiments showed seeds could be blown up to a quarter mile, so reforestation merely meant leaving a certain density of seed trees within a clearcut. Never mind that conservation was low on corporate priorities so even these few trees were often not left.
When the Federal Government during the Roosevelt administration began to take notice of how federal lands were being pillaged the states and industry responded by a sudden interest in regulations to block this ‘intevention’. Once the attention passed, the industry moved to self regulation with the compliance of the states (Washington state and Article X as self monitoring example). BC, championed by then outsider Duff Patullo went through a similar period of industrial scrutiny, but the Depression left any attempt to seriously regulate industry behind.
By the end of Rajala’s story all the elements of modern mass production logging have come together. Large clearcuts are rationalized by the industry and “independent” Forestry School academics as natural, even beneficial. Thus “Tree Farms” and “sustained yield” become the rationale for ever larger and faster deforestation. Forests are “harvested”, job security and “community stability” become public relations facades with little connection to reality. But I digress, and Rajala stops short in 1965 so as to avoid the modern contentious era.
With luck, Rajala’s hope that forest Workers and Environmentalists will see that sustainable jobs and forests have more in common with each other, than either has with multinational Corporate profits.